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Introduction to Special Topic Section on
TRANSPERSONAL ANTHROPOLOGY
The Ethno-Epistemology of Transpersonal Experience:
The View from Transpersonal Anthropology
Charles D. Laughlin

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
This paper introduces the topic of ethno-epistemology with regards to transpersonal experiences.
The distinction between polyphasic and monophasic cultures is introduced and the interaction
between a society’s world view and individual transpersonal experience is explained using the cycle of
meaning model. A link to philosophical work on “natural epistemology” is made and the importance
of the “projectability” of cultural theories of experience is discussed. The individual contributions to
this special section of the journal are introduced.
Keywords: alternative states of consciousness, reality, ethno-epistemology, brain,
natural epistemology, experience-near
Epistemological, metaphysical and axiological continuity must be in harmony if we are to have a coherent naturalistic
picture of the world as well as human end-seeking and activity within it.
			
—Maffie, 1990, p. 290
It should be possible to formulate more explicitly the necessary and sufficient conditions that make a human existence
possible and which account for the distinctive quality of human experience.
			
—Hallowell, 1967, pp. vii-viii
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he literature in transpersonal anthropology
extends back into the 19th century, and is
rich in the range of transpersonal experiences
described among the planet’s cultures (see Campbell
& Staniford, 1978; Laughlin, 1989, 1994a; Laughlin,
McManus, & Shearer, 1983; Peters, 1994, 1996;
Schroll, 2011; Schroll & Schwartz, 2005; LaHood,
2007; Gaffin, 2012). Transpersonal anthropology is
the cross-cultural study of transpersonal experiences,
including the sociocultural evocation, interpretation,
and utility of transpersonal experiences, and their
involvement in defining social roles. Of particular
concern for anthropologists is the various ways rituals
and psychoactive substances are used to encourage
and evoke transpersonal experiences, and how these
experiences are integrated into their social identity.
Holocultural research1 has shown that the vast majority

of the 4000-plus human societies seek altered states
of consciousness (ASC) and integrate information
obtained about themselves and the world from these
experiences into their world view (Bourguignon, 1973,
2003; Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977). My group has
called such peoples polyphasic cultures (see Laughlin,
this volume)—cultures in which both the world view
and the individual’s identity are specifically informed
from experiences in ASCs (i.e., dreaming, visions, drug
trips, rituals, and ordeals, etc.). Polyphasic cultures are
significantly different from monophasic cultures of the
sort that is typical of modern, materialistic, technocratic
societies like the Euro-American-Aussie one, as well as
modern industrial Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian
societies. Monophasic cultures are those that privilege
experiences had in what is called “normal waking states”
as opposed to “alternative states” such as dreaming,
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Figure 1. The Cycle of Meaning. Individual experiences arise as a consequence of social activities that derive their meaning
from the society’s world view. Activities lead to direct experiences (incubated dreams, visions, drug trips, etc.) that are then
interpreted in accordance with the world view. Experience functions to vivify and verify the world view, and instantiate the
symbolic materials presented in the social activities. In the case of truly novel experiences, the interpretation may result in an
alteration of the world view and the meanings of its constituent symbolism.
visions, drug trips, ritual enactments, and so forth.
Monophasic culture is correlated with a materialistic
world view. All monophasic societies, however, retain
elements or sub-cultures that tend toward the polyphasic,
and all were once entirely polyphasic in their pre-modern
world views and practices.
The Cycle of Meaning
ngagement in ASCs among traditional peoples
almost never occurs outside a social context.
Rather, the emphasis is upon integration of individual
experiences within a social process that has elsewhere
been modeled as a cycle of meaning (see Figure 1).
Take for example a typical dream incubation
situation (see Laughlin, 2011, pp. 221-231). A person is
seeking guidance from ancestors, spirits, or gods, and
travels to a special place where she prepares herself by
purification and other rituals (often under the guidance
of a priest), dons special clothing, prays, then sleeps in a
sacred place (a grove, cave, so forth) and upon waking,
relates her dream to the priest who helps her interpret
the meaning of the dream(s) relative to both the
problem she is seeking to solve, and her culture’s world
view. However, the experience and its interpretation
relate to her individual problem, the process has both
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instantiated her world view in direct experience (e.g., she
has been visited by a revered ancestor from the City of
the Dead), and she has gained real-life experience that
becomes part of the meaning of her culture’s sacred
symbolism in her own mind. By direct experience I
mean what Kohut (1978/2011, pp. 268-271; see also
Kohut & Goldberg, 1984) termed “experience-near”
as opposed to “experience-distant”. The difference
is one of relative abstraction from direct, immediate
experience. As Geertz (2000, p. 57) noted, “love” is
experience-near, while “object-cathexis” is experiencedistant. If, as sometimes happens, her experience is
perceived by herself or the priest as novel, it may lead to
a transformation of the meaning of symbolic material
and thus the world view. This is the kind of cultural
transformation that anthropologist Wallace (1956,
1966) called “revitalization”. McGee (2012) offered
a marvelous example among the people of Haiti of
the positive feedback that may occur between dream
experiences and the people’s world view. As he wrote,
“Dreams are vital sources of liturgical novelty in Haitian
Vodou—and this novelty is, itself, an underdescribed
and understudied quality that the religion possesses” (p.
83).
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he reported his dream to a Quiché interpreter. He was
told it was a good dream, but that the next time he
dreamed of receiving a gift of food from an ancestor
spirit, he should eat it immediately. Interpretations of
the same material may vary widely across cultures, and
perhaps even among different interpreters within a single
society.
Natural Epistemology
Much of Western academic metaphysics
is inapplicable to cross-cultural situations; this is
for several reasons. In the first place, they are often
armchair ruminations without empirically-supportable
hypotheses. In the second place, these ruminations
are ethnocentric, linked to Western values and ways of
knowing. In the third place, most are uninformed by
the natural sciences, especially evolutionary biology and
neuroscience. In the fourth place, the assumptions of
professional metaphysicians may be of an a priori nature
that is unrelated either to empirical science or more
traditional notions in other cultures. However, one of the
more useful formulations coming out of philosophical
thought has been an increasing call for naturalizing
epistemology (Goldman, 1992, 1999; Devitt, 1991;
Boyd, 1981, 1984, 1991; Maffie, 1990, 1991, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002). According to philosopher of science Maffie
(1999):

Natural Epistemology
and Ethno-Epistemology
hile anthropologists have recorded a vast amount
of information about transpersonal experiences
and sociocultural systems, they have almost always done
so by describing local folk beliefs as related to them
by host elders and religious/ritual practitioners (e.g.,
Grindal, 1983; Harner, 1973; Lederman, 1988; Long,
1976). The emphasis has usually been on what people
believe—what people claim to know about themselves,
others, and the world around them. In other words,
anthropologists are generally satisfied in asking about a
people’s ethno-ontology. They rarely go on to ask about
the people’s ethno-epistemology—that is, how do people
come to know what they claim to know. Returning to the
hypothetical dream incubation scenario related above,
our dream-seeker comes from a group of people who
believe that ancestors, spirits, gods, and so forth inhabit
a spiritual domain which, among other places, includes a
City of the Dead. This is an ethno-ontological description
referring to the society’s world view—their belief system.
Yet the description does not tell us how the people come
to know that there is a spirit world, that they may access
that world in dreams, and obtain information from such
encounters of use during waking consciousness.
Rule of Multiple Interpretations
It helps here to understand that any direct
experience is open to multiple interpretations. In
other words, abstracting meaning from experience is
an interpretive (hermeneutic) process. This is the case
regardless of the experience (transpersonal or otherwise)
or the culture from which the experiencer belongs. Put
negatively, the rule of multiple interpretations states: There
is no such thing as an experience or an intuition that admits
of one and only one interpretation (Laughlin, 1994b;
Laughlin, 2011, p. 489). Following is an example of this
rule. Barbara Tedlock (1992) told an interesting story
about her husband, Dennis Tedlock, who had a dream
while in the field among the Quiché Maya. He dreamt
“of receiving an ear of corn from an unknown person at
a party; when he opened the husk the corn was already
roasted, with butter, salt, lime juice, and chili powder
on it” (pp. 105-106). He did not eat the corn, however.
Tedlock realized that had her husband reported that
dream to a Zuni interpreter with whom they had
previously done research, it would have been viewed as a
very bad omen: that he would die if not treated to avoid a
drastic outcome. However, instead of a Zuni interpreter,

A naturalized epistemology is one that is open to the
empirical study of how the acquisition of knowledge
actually occurs, as well as how people conceptualize
such acquisition. As Maffie suggested, the study of
epistemology may extend to people across cultures.
Indeed, Maffie (2002) himself analyzed the epistemology
of the Nahuatl-speaking cultures of Mexico during
the 16th century. In testing Goldman’s (1992, 1999)
notion of veritism (that all people everywhere seek
knowledge and relate language-based, descriptive, and
conceptual knowledge to the truth), Maffie showed that
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Naturalists reject epistemology as First Philosophy,
[that is] as an autonomous a priori enterprise prior
to and normative for all other inquiry. They propose
instead an epistemology that is continuous with
science: one conducted within science, as part
of science. Naturalists endeavor to create such
continuity by extending the epistemology of the
sciences (i.e. their a posteriori evidential practices) as
well as the substantive findings of science into the
epistemology of epistemology. (p. 23)

the presumption of veritism—that people everywhere
rationally judge the truth of statements by their
correspondence to facts—like so many other notions in
Western philosophy, is ethnocentric and a projection of
Western values upon another, alien culture.
Transpersonal Experience
and Nelson Goodman’s “Projectability”
One of the most valuable notions coming out
of naturalistic epistemology—and the closest view
I have yet found in philosophy to my own multiple
interpretation rule—is Goodman’s (1973, Ch. 4)
projectability characteristic of scientific theories:
A hypothesis will be said to be actually projected when
it is adopted after some of its instances have been
examined and determined to be true, and before
the rest have been examined. The hypothesis need
not be true, or lawlike, or even reasonable; for we
are speaking here not of what ought to be projected
but of what is in fact projected. Moreover, we are not
concerned with the question whether a hypothesis is
projected in the tenseless sense that there is some past,
present or future time at which it is projected.We are
concerned at any given time only with projections
that have already been made. (pp. 87-88)
As Boyd (1984) put it, “given any finite body of data,
there are infinitely many different general theories that
are logically consistent with those data” (p. 57). Of course
Boyd is a constructivist and would have one believe there
is no way to evaluate which theory that fits the facts
should be accepted. It is all a matter of “paradigms”, to use
Kuhn’s (1974) term. However, that is an issue for another
time, and one that does not diminish in any way the
utility of projectability as a characteristic of scientific or
cultural theories, and, more importantly for ethnological
purposes, the hermeneutics of transpersonal experiences.
Projectability is inherent in any living cycle of meaning,
and is part of the axes of interpretation and instantiation.
When reading Tonkinson’s description (this volume) of
the relations between individual experience and The
Dreaming among Australian Aborigines, there is a
perfect example of the timeless nature of projectability
as noted by Goodman, and how projectability operates
to maintain the Aboriginal cycle of meaning.
Put in more neuropsychological terms, it is
precisely the nature of the brain to develop an internal
reality model (or cognitive map) that derives from and
in turn is projected back upon direct experiences. Any
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moment of conscious experience is a neurophysiological
act which melds sensory input and cognitive models
(Laughlin, McManus, & D’Aquili, 1990, pp. 28-29).
Perceptual/cognitive models inform the experience
precisely because they are projectable upon patterns of
sensory input. Obviously, any number of alternative
models can be projected onto any given set of sensory
data (hence the rule of multiple interpretations above),
and that is when culture may, and usually does, influence
experience.
The term “transpersonal” is often bandied
about as a catch-all term for every kind of extraordinary
experience. Yet if we use the term in its more technical
sense, and define transpersonal experience as any
experience that transcends ego expectations—this calls
a person’s identity into question because of dissonance
between what was once thought about oneself and one’s
well-ordered world and what one is actually experiencing
(Walsh & Vaughan, 1980)—then it follows that an
experience that is transpersonal for one person may
not be transpersonal for another. The experience may
produce ego-changing dissonance in the former person
and fail to do so for the latter. This is particularly
relevant when considering the nature of transpersonal
experience across cultures. If one is raised in a polyphasic
culture to expect encounters with “other-than-human
persons” (Hallowell, 2002, p. 20) such as ghosts, sprites,
gods, ancestors, et cetera, then such encounters may
not cause dissonance. However, if one is raised in a
Western technocratic and monophasic society in which
one is taught to disbelieve in such encounters, then such
an experience might be “mind-blowing”, so to speak.
Transpersonal experience thus has a lot to do with what
a person’s world view prepares her or him to project upon
potentially transpersonal experience.
What is found among polyphasic peoples is
that they typically have cultures that incorporate a
transpersonal cycle of meaning. That is, not only do
the people mount symbolic and ritual methods for
evoking transpersonal experiences, they also provide
interpretations, or perhaps models, that are easily
projectable onto whatever experiences arise during the
process. If one speaks in tongues, that is because one is
filled with the Holy Spirit. If one dreams of a conversation
with a long-dead Aunt Lucy, then it is because one
aunt has traveled from the City of the Dead to impart
important information. Such experiences instantiate
the cultural theory, because the cultural theory is easily
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projectable onto the experience. This is the root of all
real-life, everyday hermeneutics.
There is no clearer example of projectability than
the attribution of meaning onto the landscape. Devereux
(this volume) offers a wonderful survey of the many
sacred sites around the world that derive their meaning
in part because they are simulacra—features that remind
local people of elements in their mythology. A mountain
ridge is seen as a sleeping chief, a rock feature is seen
as a bleeding vulva, a rock bears the resemblance to a
buffalo. What one projects upon such features is heavily
determined by one’s culture. There is a famous rock
formation in New Mexico known in English as Shiprock,
from which the town of Shiprock takes its name. As one
gazes at this geological feature, driving toward it from the
east, it does resemble an old sailing ship to Western eyes.
But the Navajo long ago projected a bird wing onto that
same formation and named it Tse’Bit’Ai, or “rock with
wings”. The Navajo understand that the bird itself and
its other wing are underground and hence hidden from
sight, while Westerners see the feature entirely above
ground—a sailing ship plying the sea. This difference in
projection and interpretation is significant relative to the
two cultures’ very different world views.
Experience:
The Root of Ethno-Epistemology
he task we six anthropologists set for ourselves for
this special section was to think about how various
peoples come to know what they claim to know with
respect to transpersonal experiences. Of course people in
all cultures know a lot of things simply because they were
taught them. They believe because that is the way their
worldview tells them to believe. Most Westerners believe
the Earth rotates around the sun, and that microscopic
creatures produce disease, and these things are believed
because they were taught. However, our question is more
refined. We want to know the influence of transpersonal
experience—experience that is, by definition,
transformative in some way—on the beliefs of people,
and how those beliefs anticipate, set-up, encourage, evoke
and offer interpretations of extraordinary experiences.
This question is much harder to answer by reading
much of the ethnography of religious and spiritual
experiences. There are excellent exceptions, of course,
and these are almost always written by anthropologists
that have had transpersonal experiences themselves (see,
e.g., Bharati, 1975; Furst, 1976; George, 1995; Goulet,
1998; Goulet & Miller, 2007; Grindal, 1983; Harner,

1973; Krippner & Friedman, 2010; Lederman, 1988;
Long, 1976; Winkelman, 2010; Young & Goulet, 1994).
Methodologically speaking, there really is no alternative
for the ethnographic fieldworker but to open herself up
to potentially transformative experiences (Laughlin,
1989).
Implied in this methodology is the core answer
to our question about ethno-epistemology. As each
contributor in his or her own way confirms, the roots
of local transpersonal knowledge are grounded in direct
experience. Some may receive knowledge via tradition,
but people everywhere, especially in polyphasic societies,
believe in the spiritual domain precisely because
they experience its reality. A thing is true because I
experience it to be real. In this volume, I discuss the
phenomenology of dreaming and show why one might
reach the conclusion that, not just waking consciousness
but all states of consciousness are real. Moreover, I make
the point that experiences had in ASCs make available
potentially transformative information to the dreamer
and quite often to the community (see also McGee,
2012). Tonkinson (this volume) takes us among the
Mardu Aboriginies who live in Australia’s Western
Desert region. The Mardu people see themselves as
conduits of information between the timeless Dreaming
and the everyday life of the community. Because they are
able to leave their corporeal bodies at night and travel
long distances to engage with Dreamtime spirits, ASCs
are the source of creativity and transformation in both
culture and social identity. The grounding of reality in
a timeless mythopoeic spiritual domain is not limited
to traditional ontologies, but is also reflected in modern
physics of the sort Bohm (1980) described. Schroll (this
volume) encapsulates Bohm’s thinking about what
he called the “implicate order” of physical realty. The
implicate order is, like the Dreamtime, a timeless domain
that makes possible an understanding of how there may
be a continuum from mind to matter. Is it possible that
traditional epistemologies of people everywhere intuit the
truth of the implicate order, and thus almost inevitably
see everything as ontologically entangled in a vast whole?
Recognizing that polyphasic peoples do in fact
consider their worldviews as grounded in experienced
reality, and that confirmation of this contention involves
direct and transpersonal engagement with the world,
Glass-Coffin (this volume)—like Turner (1996) before
her—raises the obvious question: Why do so many
anthropologists and other transpersonal researchers
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fail to take our hosts’ descriptions of “other-thanhuman sentience” seriously? All too often ethnographic
presentations of these important descriptions are
couched in constructivist (relativist) narratives that
allow the researcher to implicitly disavow the fact
that these are lived realities to the people having those
experiences. Why else would people take such interest
in sacred places, like those described for us by Devereux
(this volume)? Not only that, but why else go to such
extreme efforts to construct elaborate megalithic and
spiritual centers like Stonehenge? The power that people
describe for such sacred places is, once again, grounded
in direct experience, and hence considered as part—
indeed, a very pivotal part—of reality. As Devereux
notes, and as Winkelman (this volume) also emphasizes,
many of these elements, both material and spiritual,
are part of the many shamanic traditions across the
planet. Shamanistic practices in a sense involve a social
maximization of the ability to enter ASCs and engage
with the other-than-human beings, cosmic power,
spiritual insights, and healing potential available to those
who can access alternative realities.
References
Bharati, A. (1975). The tantric tradition. New York, NY:
Samuel Weiser.
Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the implicate order.
Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bourguignon, E. (1973). Religion, altered states of
consciousness, and social change. Columbus, OH:
Ohio State University Press.
Bourguignon, E. (2003). Dreams that speak: Experience
and interpretation. In J. M. Mageo (Ed.), Dreaming
and the self: New perspectives on subjectivity, identity,
and emotion, (pp. 133-153). Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.
Bourguignon, E., & Evascu, T. L. (1977). Altered states
of consciousness within a general evolutionary
perspective: A holocultural analysis. Cross-Cultural
Research, 12(3), 197-216. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.11
77/106939717701200303
Boyd, R. (1981). Scientific realism and naturalized
epistemology. In P. D. Asquith & R. N. Giere,
(Eds.), PSA 1980 (pp. 613-662). East Lansing, MI:
Philosophy of Science Association.
Boyd, R. (1984). The current status of scientific realism.
In J. Leplin, (Ed.), Scientific Realism (pp. 41-82).
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

48

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

Boyd, R. (1991). Confirmation, semantics, and the
interpretation of scientific theories. In R. Boyd,
P. Gasper, & J. D. Trout, (Eds.), The Philosophy of
Science (pp. 3-35). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Campbell, R. L., & Staniford, P. S. (1978). Transpersonal
anthropology. Phoenix: The Journal of Transpersonal
Anthropology, 2(1), 28-40.
Devitt, M. (1991). Realism and truth (2nd ed.). Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Furst, P. (1976). Hallucinogens and culture. San Francisco,
CA: Chandler & Sharp.
Gaffin, D. (2012). Running with the fairies: Towards a
transpersonal anthropology of religion. Newcastle
upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars.
Geertz. C. (2000). Local knowledge. New York, NY:
Basic Books.
George, M. (1995). Dreams, reality, and the desire and
intent of dreamers as experienced by a fieldworker.
Anthropology of Consciousness, 6(3), 17-33. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.1525/ac.1995.6.3.17
Goldman, A. (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive
and social sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Goodman, N. (1973). Fact, fiction, and forecast (3rd ed.).
New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill.
Goulet, J. (1998). Ways of knowing: Experience,
knowledge, and power among the Dene Tha. Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Goulet, J., & Bruce, G. M. (Eds.). (2007). Extraordinary
anthropology: Transformations in the field. Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Grindal, B. T. (1983). Into the heart of Sisala
experience: Witnessing death divination. Journal of
Anthropological Research, 39(1), 60-80.
Hallowell, A. I. (1967). Culture and experience. New
York, NY: Schocken.
Hallowell, A. I. (2002). Ojibwa ontology, behavior,
and world view. In G. Harvey (Ed.), Readings in
indigenous religions (pp. 17-49). New York, NY:
Continuum.
Harner, M. J. (1973). Hallucinogens and shamanism.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kohut, H. (2011). Reflections on advances in self
psychology. In P. H. Ornstein (Ed.), The search
for the self: Selected writings of Heinz Kohut 19781981 (Vol. 3, pp. 261-357). London, UK: Karnac.
(Original work published 1978)

Laughlin

Kohut, H., & Goldberg, A. (1984). How does analysis
cure? Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Krippner, S., & Friedman, H. L. (Eds.). (2010). Debating
psychic experience: Human potential or human illusion.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Kuhn, T. S. (1974). Second thoughts on paradigms. In
F. Suppe (Ed.), The structure of s cientific theories (pp.
293-319). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
LaHood, G. (2007). One hundred years of sacred
science: Participation and hybridity in transpersonal
anthropology. Re-Vision, 29(3), 37-48. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.3200/REVN.29.3.37-48
Laughlin, C. D. (1989). Transpersonal anthropology:
Some methodological issues. Western Canadian
Anthropologist, 5, 29-60.
Laughlin, C. D. (1994a). Transpersonal anthropology,
then and now. Transpersonal Review, 1(1), 7-10.
Laughlin, C. D. (1994b). Apodicticity: The problem of
absolute certainty in transpersonal anthropology.
Anthropology and Humanism, 19(2), 115.
Laughlin, C. D. (2011). Communing with the gods:
Consciousness, culture, and the dreaming brain.
Brisbane, Australia: Daily Grail.
Laughlin, C. D., McManus, J., & D’Aquili, E. G.
(1990). Brain, symbol and experience: Toward a
neurophenomenology of human consciousness. New
York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Laughlin, C. D., McManus, J., & Shearer, J. (1983).
Dreams, trance and visions: What a transpersonal
anthropology might look like. Phoenix: The Journal
of Transpersonal Anthropology, 7(1/2), 141-159.
Lederman, C. (1988). Wayward winds: Malay archetypes, and theory of personality in the context of
shamanism. Social Science & Medicine, 27(8), 799-810.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(88)90232-8
Long, J. K. (1976). Shamanism, trance, hallucinogens,
and psychical events: Concepts, methods, and
techniques for fieldwork among primitives. In A.
Bharati (Ed.), The realm of the extra-human: Agents
and audiences (Vol. 1, pp. 301-314). The Hague, The
Netherlands: Mouton.
Maffie, J. (1990). Recent work on naturalized
epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly,
27(4), 281-293.
Maffie, J. (1999). Epistemology in the face of
strong sociology of knowledge. History of the
Human Sciences, 12(4), 21-40. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/09526959922120450

Maffie, J. (2000). Alternative epistemologies and the
value of truth. Social Epistemology, 14(4), 247-257.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0269172001/0008617
Maffie, J. (2001). Editor’s introduction: Truth from the
perspective of comparative world philosophy. Social
Epistemology, 15(4), 263-273. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/02691720110093298
Maffie, J. (2002). Why care about Nezahualcoyotl?
Veritism and Nahua philosophy. Philosophy of
the Social Sciences, 32(1), 71-91. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/004839310203200104
McGee, A. M. (2012). Dreaming in Haitian Vodou:
Vouchsafe, guide, and source of liturgical novelty.
Dreaming, 22(2), 83-100. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1037/a0026691
Peters, L. G. (1994). Rites of passage and the
borderline syndrome: Perspectives in transpersonal
anthropology. Anthropology of Consciousness, 5(1),
1-15. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ac.1994.5.1.1
Peters, L. G. (1996). The contribution of anthropology to
transpersonal psychiatry. In B. Scotton, A. Chinen,
& J. Battista (Eds.),Textbook of Transpersonal
Psychiatry and Psychology (pp. 207-216). New York,
NY: Basic Books.
Schroll, M. A. (2011). Editor’s introduction: From
primordial anthropology to a transpersonal ecosophy.
Anthropology of Consciousness, 22(1), 4-8. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-3537.2011.01033.x
Schroll, M. A., & Schwartz, S. A. (2005). Whither
psi and anthropology? An incomplete history of
SAC’s origins, its relationship with transpersonal
psychology and the untold stories of Castañeda’s
controversy. Anthropology of Consciousness, 16(1),
6-24. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ac.2005.
16.1.6
Tedlock, B. (1992). Zuni and Quiché dream sharing
and interpreting. In B. Tedlock (Ed.), Dreaming:
Anthropological and psychological interpretations (pp.
105-131). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Turner, E. (1996). The hands feel it: Healing and spirit
presence among a Northern Alaskan people. DeKalb,
IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
Wallace, A. F. C. (1956). Revitalization movements.
American Anthropologist, 58, 264-81. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.1956.58.2.02a00040
Wallace, A. F. C. (1966). Religion: An anthropological
view. New York, NY: Random House.

Ethno-Epistemology of Transpersonal Experience

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 49

Walsh, R. N., & Vaughan, F. (1980). Beyond ego:
Transpersonal dimensions in psychology. Los Angeles,
CA: J. P. Tarcher.
Winkelman, M. J. (2010). Shamanism: A biopsychosocial
paradigm of consciousness and healing (2nd ed.). Santa
Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Young, D., & Goulet, J. G. (Eds.). (1994). Being changed
by cross cultural encounters: The anthropology of
extraordinary experience. Peterborough, Canada:
Broadview Press.
Note
1. Holocultural research is a method used by
anthropologists to test hypotheses about psychology,
culture, or social organization using a world-wide
sample of societies. The research is usually statistical
and of a correlational nature.
About the Author
Charles D. Laughlin, PhD, is an emeritus professor of
anthropology and religion, Department of Sociology
& Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa. He has
completed ethnographic research among the So people
of northeastern Uganda, Tibetan Tantric Buddhist
lamas in Nepal, Chinese Buddhists in southeast Asia,
and the Navajo of the American Southwest. He is the
co-author of Brain, Symbol and Experience (1990) and
author of Communing With the Gods: Consciousness,
Culture and the Dreaming Brain (2011). He specializes
in the neuroanthropology of consciousness.

50

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

Laughlin

